





Economic Effects of Taxing Closed Corporations  











Under the Nordic dual income tax system, the taxpayer’s total tax bill depends not 
only on his total income but also on the division of that income between capital 
income and labor income. This has created new room for tax avoidance, especially 
for active owners of (closed) corporations. For that reason the Nordic governments 
have enacted special income-splitting rules and this paper examines the economic 
effects of these rules. The Swedish scheme of taxing closed corporations is shown 
to be neutral in its impact on the allocation of resources between closely and widely 
held corporations, and the cost of capital is invariant to the rate at which capital 
income is imputed to the owner. The Finnish system rather increases the 
attractiveness of investing in closed corporations, while the Norwegian scheme 
may or may not cause the cost of capital to be different from that of widely held 
corporations. Finally, for Swedish tax rules, we show that the owner’s labor supply 
may decrease as a response to a more lenient tax treatment. 
 
 
Keywords: dual income taxation, tax avoidance, corporate taxation, cost of capital 
 
JEL Code: H24, H25, H32 
                                                 
* We are grateful to Jan Gaute Sannarnes and other participants in Skatteforum 2001 for useful comments. 
Special thanks are due to Ulf Pedersen and Hans Henrik Scheel of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance for 
explaining the intricacies of the Norwegian tax rules. We take full responsibility for remaining errors. 
** Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Box 513, S-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. 





Following the major tax reforms in the beginning of the 1990’s, the Nordic countries 
abandoned the conventional global income tax in favor of a so-called dual income tax 
(Sörensen (1998)). Under a global income tax, a single progressive tax schedule is applied to 
the sum of the taxpayer’s income from all sources. A dual income tax system, as used in the 
Nordic countries today, instead combines progressive taxation of labor income with a flat rate 
of tax on capital income (e.g. interest, dividends and capital gains). There were several 
reasons for the introduction of the dual income tax system, including a desire to reduce the 
distortionary effects of progressive income taxation in an inflationary environment, to 
strengthen private savings incentives, and generally to limit the scope for tax arbitrage
1.  
 
Under the Nordic dual income tax, capital income is taxed at a lower rate than the top 
marginal tax rate on labor income, and the preferential tax treatment of capital income is 
reinforced because of the fact that social security taxes are levied only on labor income. Thus, 
the taxpayer’s total tax bill depends not only on his total income, but also on his income 
division. This has created new room for tax avoidance, especially for owners of small 
business firms who are able to lower tax payments by transforming labor income subject to 
high marginal tax rates into capital income subject to low tax rates. Indeed, small business 
firms, where labor and capital income accrue jointly, has been judged to be the Achilles heel 
of the dual income tax (Sörensen (1994), cf. also Cnossen (1997)). The tax discrimination 
between income from labor and capital has forced the Nordic governments to find new ways 
of taxing income from small corporations.  
 
The Nordic governments have focused on a method of income-splitting called the “source 
model”
2. Business income from a corporation with an active owner, denoted a closed or 
closely held corporation
3, is split into two components, derived from capital and labor. The 
capital income component is imputed, and the residual business income is categorized as 
labor income.  
 
                                                 
1 Hagen and Sörensen (1998), pp. 57.  
2 For a full discussion, see. Hagen and Sörensen (1998). 
3 The Swedish term is ”Fåmansföretag”.  2
While all Nordic countries have income-splitting rules for closely held corporations, the 
design of these rules differs. In Sweden and Finland, the imputed income from capital 
determines the tax treatment of cash dividends. If actual dividends exceed the imputed return, 
the difference is taxed as earned income of the shareholder. In the following, we will call this 
a graduated dividend tax scheme. In Norway, the rules for taxation are based on a system that 
splits the pre-tax income of the closed corporation independently of the dividend decision. 
Another difference between the countries is how the imputed capital income is calculated. In 
Sweden, the imputed rate is applied to the acquisition price of the shares, while in Finland and 
Norway, it is applied to the net or gross business assets. 
 
Tax-motivated shifting of income between different tax bases has attracted some interest in 
recent research. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) have investigated two forms of payout 
from corporations to owners, as wages and dividends, and have found that individuals easily 
can lower tax payments by shifting their form of pay. In a related study, the authors examine 
tax distortions to the choice of organizational form (Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994)).  
 
Nordic research within this area include Fjaerli and Lund (2001), which is an exploratory 
empirical investigation of tax shifting behavior, based on data of single owners and their 
corporations in Norway, and Andersen (1994a and 1994b), who examines how taxes affect 
the way firms are organized and tax neutrality with respect to legal form of organization. An 
important issue relating to the taxation of the closed company is the economic function of 
risk-bearing. The incentives for risk-taking have been studied by Sannarnes (1995) and by 
Hagen and Sörensen (1998). Both of these studies conclude inter alia that a dual income tax 
that treats residual business income as labor income may tend to encourage risk-taking, 
compared to a tax regime where all rewards to risk-taking are taxed as income from capital.   
 
A recent study by Kari (1999), which is more directly related to the analysis in the present 
paper, focuses on the splitting of dividend income into capital and earned income parts. A 
dynamic deterministic model in continuous time is used, closely following the approach in 
Sinn (1991). Kari’s study amounts to comparing the firm’s behavior under a graduated 
dividend tax system to that under a linear system, and he finds that the long-run neutrality of 
dividend taxation with respect to investment decisions, shown by Sinn, breaks down when a 
graduated tax scheme is introduced. However, by ignoring the owner’s possibility to choose  3
between wages and dividends as alternative forms of withdrawing earnings from the firm, 
Kari leaves out much of the complexity of the problem of taxing closed corporations. 
 
The purpose of this paper it to analyze the economic effects of the special rules introduced for 
closely held corporations by the Nordic governments, to counter the income shifting 
incentives. We set up a dynamic model, which is related both to the standard neoclassical 
model of firm behavior, as used in the taxation literature, and to the static farm household 
model, see Hamermesh (1993). The owner of a closed corporation is assumed to maximize 
her utility, and determines the optimal trade-off between consumption and savings, between 
work and leisure, between how much labor effort to put into the own firm and how much to 
supply in the external market, and the optimal seize and time path of the firm’s capital stock.  
 
By examining the long-run cost of capital we conclude that the Swedish scheme of taxing 
closed corporations is neutral in its impact on the allocation of resources between closely and 
widely held corporations, and, moreover, that the cost of capital is invariant to the rate at 
which capital income is imputed to the owner. The Finnish system, where the assets of the 
corporation (rather than the acquisition cost of the shares as in Sweden) form the basis for 
imputing income from capital, rather increases the attractiveness of investing in closed 
corporations, and thereby reallocates capital to this sector of the economy. The Norwegian 
scheme, finally, may or may not cause the cost of capital to be different from that of widely 
held corporations. The exact outcome hinges on the relationship between the rate of imputing 
capital income and the owner’s pre-tax rate of return requirement.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, following this introduction, we describe the 
Nordic rules for taxation of corporations with no more than a few active owners. Chapter 3 
provides a derivation of the theoretical framework. In chapter 4, we proceed to examine the 
economic effects of taxation focusing on the closed corporation’s long-run and short-run cost 
of capital. Using numerical simulation we explore a growth path for the firm of the type 
suggested by Sinn (1991). This chapter also contains a brief discussion of the effects of 
taxation on owner’s labor supply. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the study. 
  4
2. Tax legislation in the Nordic countries 
Effective tax rates on income from capital and labor 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how income from closed corporations is taxed in 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland. While all Nordic countries have income-splitting rules for 
closed corporations, the specific details differ between the countries. These different rules for 
taxation are described further below. However, we begin the chapter by giving a brief 
overview of the taxation of income from labor and income from capital. The tax policy in the 
Nordic countries with special and complicated tax rules for closed corporations should be 
viewed in the light of the incentives for tax shifting highlighted in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Nordic tax parameters in 2000. 
Percent 
Item  Sweden Norway  Finland 
Statutory rate of corporation tax (τ )  28  28 29 
Tax rate on personal capital income ( pi τ )  30 28  29 
Personal tax on dividends ( pd τ )  30 0
4 0
5 
Total tax on income from corporate capital
6  49.6  28
7  29 
Labor income tax ( pw τ ), there of:  57 49.3  56.63 
         National statutory tax rate on labor income  25 
> 374 000 SEK
21.3
8 




> 315 000 FIM 
         Local tax rate on labor income (average)  32 28  17.63 
General payroll tax (p)  32.92 14.1
11 18-29
12 
Total tax on labor income
13  67.6 55.6  66.4 
Source: Tax parameters in Sweden and Finland: Ministry of Finance, Sweden, Tax Commission 1999:12. 
             Tax parameters in Norway: Ulf Pedersen, Ministry of Finance, Norway. The authors own calculations. 
 
                                                 
4 In 2001, because of the imputation system the effective tax rate is zero for dividends up to the personal income 
(for definition see Norway below), and 11 percent for dividends above the limit. 
5 Finland uses an imputation system implying an effective tax rate of zero.  
6 Defined as:  (1 ) pd τ ττ +− , where τ  is the corporate tax rate and  pd τ  is the dividend tax rate. 
7 In 2001, we define the total tax as:  () 1 35.9% pd ττ τ +− = , where  0.28 τ =  and  0.11 pd τ = . 
8 Social insurance and pension contribution, 7.8 percent, is included in the national statutory tax rate on labor 
income (0.078+0.135=0.213). If labor income > 793 200 NOK, the total national statutory tax rate is set to 27.3 
percent (0.078+0.195=0.273). 
9 In 2001, between 289 000-793 200 NOK. 
10 Social insurance and pension contribution, 1.5 percent, is included in the national statutory tax rate on labor 
income (0.015+0.375=0.39). This total tax rate may be reduced to 38.5 percent in 2001. 
11 26.6% for labor income over 774 000 NOK (in 2001, this limit is 809 600). 
12 According to the size of the company. 






, where p is the payroll tax rate and  pw τ  is the labor income tax rate.  5
The total tax on income from corporate capital - measured as the combined weight of the tax 
on corporate profits and the personal tax on dividends - differs considerably between the 
Nordic countries. It is clear that the personal tax on dividends completely determines the high 
level in Sweden, since dividends are only taxed once - at the corporate level - in both Norway 
and Finland. The difference between the countries in the total tax on labor income is less 
pronounced. The differential tax treatment of income from capital and labor clearly offers 
strong incentives to transform labor income into capital income.  
 
Income-splitting schemes in the Nordic countries 
Sweden 
The Swedish system of taxing closed corporations focuses on the splitting of dividend income 
into capital and labor income parts. Dividends are taxed as capital income only when equal to 
or less than the imputed return on the acquisition price of the shares
14. In the following we 
will call this normal dividends. If actual dividends exceed normal dividends, the difference, 
which we will call excess dividends, is taxed as labor income. When actual dividends are less 
than the imputed return, an amount equal to the difference may be taken out as a dividend in a 
later year. Until distributed, the amount is added to the basis for calculating the imputed 
return
15. The rules for taxing capital gains on the shares of closed corporations state in 
principle that half of the calculated gain should be treated as labor income, and the other half 
as capital income. There is an upper limit to the amount of capital gain, which may be taxed 
as labor income
16. Gains above the limit are taxed at the capital income tax rate.  
 
Sweden operates a classical system of corporate taxation. In 1997, however, a partial 
mitigation of double taxation of dividends was offered for shares in unlisted corporations. For 
closed corporations, this rule implies that a certain part of normal dividends (see above) may 
be excluded from taxation
17. This tax relief at the shareholder level can be saved and used in a 
later year. Furthermore, a wage-addendum
18 may be added to the acquisition price of the 
shares. The calculation of the wage-addendum is based on the total wages paid to the workers 
                                                 
14 The imputed return is set equal to the interest rate on 10-year government bonds (statslåneräntan) plus a 
premium of five percentage points. The acquisition price is part of the “principal rule” (Huvudregeln).  Other 
methods that may serve as the basis of the calculations are the “indexation” (Indexuppräkning) and the 
“alternative rule” (Alternativregeln). 
15 Hagen and Sörensen (1998), pp. 65. 
16 In 1999, the amount was set to 3 640 000 SEK. 
17 The Swedish term is ”Lättnadsbelopp”. Calculated according to a return (the interest rate on government 
bonds multiplied by seventy percent) on the acquisition price of the shares. 
18 The Swedish term is ”Lönesummetillägg”.  6
in the company. For the time being, we have excluded both the double tax relief and the 
wage-addendum in the calculations as an attempt to illustrate the economic effects in the 
simplest way possible. Finally, a closed company in Sweden is defined as a corporate 




Finland has adopted a similar version of the method of income-splitting used in Sweden. 
However, the capital income part is calculated as an imputed return on the net assets of the 
business
19. As in Sweden, if actual dividends exceed the imputed return, the difference is 
taxed as labor income. Actual dividends less than the imputed return cannot be saved and 
used in a later year. Finland mitigates the double taxation of corporate income by using an 
imputation system. Double taxation is completely eliminated, since the “rate of imputation” 
equals the corporate tax rate for distributed income. Capital gains on shares in closed 
corporations are only subject to capital income tax at the time of realization. 
 
The Finnish scheme for taxing owners in closed corporations is relatively simple, compared to 
the corresponding tax laws in Norway and Sweden. However, the system seems to offer 
generous opportunities for tax-avoidance by transforming labor income into capital income. 
For example, retained corporate profits will increase the amount that is taxed as capital 
income, and capital gains on shares are only subject to capital income tax.  
 
Norway 
The Norwegian tax rules are also based on a system that splits the income of closed 
corporations into two parts, denoted personal income
20 and capital income. However, this is 
done independently of how the owner withdraws the income. The residual business income in 
Norway is taxed as personal (labor) income even if the profits are not actually distributed. The 
imputed rate of return is applied to the business assets, which include for example physical 
business assets, acquired goodwill, and business inventories
21. Note also that Norway has 
chosen a “gross” method of income-splitting, i.e. profits are defined before deduction for 
                                                 
19 Assets are valued at book value or at the tax assessed value, and the imputed rate of return is set to 13.5 
percent in 2000. 
20 The Norwegian term is “Personinntekt”. 
21 Hagen and Sörensen (1998), pp. 59.  7
interest. Also Norway operates an imputation system, but according to a recent change in the 
rules, the “rate of imputation” is smaller than the corporate tax rate for distributed income
22. 
 
Capital gains in the closed corporation are always regarded as capital income. There is also an 
upper limit to the amount declared as personal income, which may be taxed as labor income
23. 
Personal income above this limit is taxed at the capital income tax rate. Another rule, much 
alike the Swedish wage-addendum, is that owners in closed corporations are allowed to make 
a “wage deduction” amounting to 20 percent of their wage bill from taxable personal income. 
Finally, a closed company in Norway is defined as a corporate business where at least two-
thirds of the shares are owned by active shareholders. As in Sweden, people close to the 
owner count as one single person.  
 
3. The model  
We examine the economic behavior of a closely held corporation by setting up a dynamic 
model, where the owner is assumed to maximize the utility of her immortal extended family.
24 
We begin by explaining the various constraints faced by the firm and the owner, and we then 
derive the optimality conditions. To keep the analysis within manageable proportions, debt 
finance is ignored.  
 
The owner’s objective and constraints on behavior 
















+ ∑ ,     (1) 
     
where utility is derived from consumption  t C  and leisure  t Z , and the discount rate β  equals 
the owner’s rate of time preference. We assume there is an external labor market for the 
owner, which means that the owner may choose between devoting all available non-leisure 
                                                 
22 Described in table 1. 
23 In 2000, the amount was set to 774 032 NOK. 
24 Cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), p. 60. 
25 Equation (1) implicitly assumes that the shares of the corporation may be inherited by the succeeding 
generations of the dynasty without inheritance or capital gains taxes.  8
time to run her own business and working part-time in the own firm and become employed in 




t t t L L T Z − − =
* ,       (2) 
 
where T is time endowment, 
*
t L  is work effort in the own firm and 
e
t L  is the amount of labor 
supplied in the external market.  
 
To determine the owner’s consumption C requires several steps that will be explained in 
equations (3) to (14) below. The closed company’s budget constraint in period t is a cash 
flow identity, where, net of corporate tax τ , capital inflow equals capital outflow 
 
  ()() () () ()
** 1, , 1 ttt t t t t t F KLL pw L W N D I τ −− + + + = + . (3) 
 
The production function  ()
*
ttt F K, L, L  depends on the stock of capital  t K , on the owner’s 
labor effort 
*
t L  and on labor  t L , which is hired at the wage rate w per unit of time. The amount 
withdrawn as the owner’s wage income 
*
t W  is not contingent on the amount of effort put into 
the firm by the owner, but is instead determined as a result of the owner’s tax planning 
activity, which we analyze below. Further, p is the payroll tax that is levied both on the 
owner’s and the employees’ wage bills.  t D  denotes dividends as defined in the firm’s 
accounts. To keep the model simple, capital depreciation is ignored, which implies that 
investment  t I  in (3) is given by the change in the capital stock 
 
  1 tt t K KI + −= .     (4) 
 
The amount of new share issues  t N  in (3) is constrained to be greater than or equal to zero, 
ruling out repurchases of own shares, i.e. 
 
 0 t N ≥ .        (5) 
  9
Closed companies can use either dividends D or wages 
* W  as channels to transfer business 
income to its owner. There is no legal restriction on which channel to use, and the owner’s 
choice is therefore solely dependent on the relative tax treatment
26, a matter we return to 
below.  
 
Sweden, Finland and Norway make use of somewhat different approaches for dividing the 
business income of closely held corporations into capital income and wage income. These 
approaches give rise to different personal tax functions that, in turn, affect the owner’s cash 
flow and budget constraint. In the next three subsections we will derive these functions for 
each country and then proceed to solve the owner’s optimization problem. 
 
Sweden 
In Sweden income withdrawn from the firm as owner’s wages is taxed at the rate  pw τ  at the 
personal level.
27 However, income distributed as dividends can be taxed at two different rates. 
In hands of the owner, normal dividends, denoted as  t R , are taxed at the personal tax rate  pd τ , 
whereas excess dividends () t t R D −  are taxed as labor income, at the rate  pw τ . It must hold 
that 
 
  t t R D ≥ ,      (6) 
 
and we also require 
 
 0 t R ≥ .      (7) 
 
The amount taxed as normal dividends, i.e. at the rate  pd τ , is limited to 
  
  () 1 1 tt t R EB ρρ − ≤+ + ,     (8) 
 
                                                 
26 However, the owner may earn social security benefits by declaring wage income, see equation (17) below.  
27 We assume that  pw τ is constant even though wage income in practice is taxed according to a progressive rate 
schedule. This assumption may still be justified on the ground that the marginal tax rate actually stays constant 
over a fairly wide range, cf. the discussion in Kari (1999).  10 
where  ρ  is the rate of imputed return discussed in chapter 2, and  t E  equals the acquisition 
cost of the firm’s shares. If the closed company does not distribute income any given year, or 
distributes less than the maximum amount allowed by the tax code as normal dividends, the 
excess may be saved (in a tax accounting sense) for later years, including interest 
compounded at the rate  ρ . We let  1 t B −  denote the accumulated amount of such unused 
normal dividends, inherited from the past. 
  
The firm adds to the acquisition cost of its shares by issuing new equity, according to  
 
1 tt t E EN − −= .     (9) 
 
The stock of unused normal dividends evolves over time as 
 
  11 1 tt t t t B BEB R ρρ −− − −= + − ,     (10) 
 
and we require that 
 
 0 t B ≥ .       ( 1 1 )  
      
The personal taxes paid by the Swedish owner on business income withdrawn from the firm 




t pd t pw t t pw t TAX R D R W ττ τ =+ − + ,       (12) 
 





t t t t pw t t pw pd t M DW T A X DW R ττ τ ≡+− = − + + − . (13) 
  
The amount of consumption  t C , finally, then follows from the owner’s budget constraint  
  11 
() () ()




tp w t t p w p d t t
ee
pw t t t pi t
CD W R N
wL b i b .
ττ τ
ττ −
=− + + − − +
−+ − + −
   (14) 
 
The first row on the right hand side of (14) is the cash flow from the company, net of the 




pw L w τ − 1  is the after-tax wage from external 
work and the last two terms represent net personal borrowing, where i is the interest rate and 
pi τ  is the personal tax rate on interest income.  
 
Finland 
Finland has adopted a graduated dividend tax scheme similar to that in Sweden, but the rules 
differ in two important ways. First, the amount of normal dividends is determined on the basis 
of the firm’s total assets, i.e. its stock of capital and, if underutilized, cannot be saved for later 
years. This means that constraint (8) changes to 
 
tt R K ρ ≤ ,       ( 8 F )  
 
while the restrictions (9), (10) and (11) used in the case of Sweden may be ignored. Second, 
Finland uses an imputation system for mitigating the double taxation of corporate income, 
both for closely and widely held corporations. We will not model the imputation system 
explicitly, but just conclude that the effect of this system is to reduce the personal tax on 
dividends  pd τ  below the personal tax rate on capital income. The other definitions and 
restrictions follow from the case of Sweden. 
 
Norway 
The Norwegian scheme differs from its counterparts in Finland and Sweden in that corporate 
income is split into capital income and so called personal income, independently of how much 
is withdrawn from the corporation as dividends. As in Finland, the capital income part equals 
an imputed rate of return times the capital stock. The amount of personal income, denoted as 
P , is obtained by subtracting total labor costs and capital income from the firm’s gross 
earnings
28 
                                                 
28 We ignore here the wage-addendum deduction described in chapter 2. This deduction may not be used to 
reduce  P  below a certain threshold and because of this, it will not affect the results of our analysis.   12 
 
  () () ()
** ,, 1 tt t t t tt P FKLL p w L W K ρ =− + + − .     (15) 
 
Personal income is taxed at the rate  pp τ , to be distinguished from the rate  pw τ
29, which applies 
the owner’s wage income 
* W . We require that 
 
0 t P ≥ ,       ( 1 6 )  
     
as a simple way to capture the assumption that the declaration of negative personal income 
does not generate any refund of tax. Constraint (6) simplifies to 
 
 0 t D ≥ ,       ( 6 N )  
 
while constraints (7) - (11) are not applicable to Norway.  
 
Also Norway makes use of an imputation system, and to simplify the exposition, we let  pd τ  
be the rate of personal tax on dividends.
30 In the case of closely held corporations, however, 
the dividend tax applies only to dividends in excess of declared personal income. The 








tp w t p p t p d t t
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     (12N) 
 
This implies a cash flow to the owner of 
 
 





pwt p dt p p p d t
MD W T A X
WD P ττ τ τ
≡+−
=− +− − −
   (13N) 
 
and the Norwegian owner’s personal budget constraint (cf. expression (14)), becomes 
                                                 
29 See chapter 2 for the parameter values.  13 
 
() () ( )




tp w t p d t p p p d t t
ee
pw t t t pi t
CWD P N
wL b i b .
ττ τ τ
ττ −
=− +− − − −
+− +−+ −
   (14N) 
 
We have now derived the owner’s personal budget constraint – equation (14) for Sweden and 
Finland and equation (14N) for Norway – which will be used when solving the optimizing 
problem. However, before proceeding to derive the optimality conditions it will be helpful to 
examine the sources of equity funds available to the closed corporation. 
 
Sources of finance 
Since we ignore debt in the model, the firm has two possible ways of acquiring additional 
funds, namely by issuing new equity and by retaining earnings. For the closed corporation, 
there are in turn two ways of obtaining additional retained earnings, by reducing dividends or 
by cutting the owner’s wages. However, we will assume that the owner chooses to withdraw 
wage income of no less than a minimum amount W , possibly to make maximum use of social 




tt t Ww L W +≥.     (17) 
 
The relative attractiveness of the two methods of internal funding obviously depends on the 
details of the tax code. In the following we will focus on the Swedish case, and only briefly 
discuss the pecking order of sources of finance for Finland and Norway at the end of this 




























   (18) 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
30 Following a recent modification of the system, shareholders are given credit for 17/28 of the 28 percent 
corporate tax against the personal capital income tax of 28 percent. The effect of this is to reduce the tax on 
shareholders’ cash dividends to 11 percent.   14 
which means that (following the description of the tax system in chapter 2 above) the total tax 
(corporate and personal) on normal dividends by assumption is less than the total tax on wage 
income (combined payroll tax and income tax), which in turn is less than the total tax on 
excess dividends (taxed at the income tax rate  pw τ at the personal level). 
 
To explore the implications of (18) for the funding of the firm, rewrite the budget constraint 
(3) in terms of investment as 
 
  tt t I RE N =+ ,     (19) 
 
where the amount of retained earnings RE is defined as  
 
() () () () ()
** 1, , 1 t ttt t t t REF K L L p w L W D τ =− −+ + − .   (20) 
 
The firm’s gross income  (). F  is fixed in the short run and any increase in the amount of 
retained earnings therefore requires a reduction either in the owner’s wage 
* W (assuming that 
(17) does not bind) or in dividends D. Because of the asymmetric tax treatment, the choice 
between 
* W  and D affects the magnitude of the owner’s after-tax cash flow M , as defined 
in (13).  A simple way to demonstrate this is to increase 
*
t W  and decrease  t D  in (20) such that 
the amount of retained earnings is unchanged 
 
() ()
* 11 0 tt t RE p W D τ ∆= − − + ∆ − ∆ = .     (21) 
 
For a given 
*
t W ∆ , expression (21) requires that  () ()
* 1 1 t t W p D ∆ + − − = ∆ τ . When 
max D R > , 
that is when the firm pays excess dividends (
max R is when constraint  (8) above binds), the 
effect on the owner’s cash flow in (13) of this change in dividends is
31  
 
                                                 
31 For a given  ()
max RR = , the change in the owner’s cash flow is obtained from (13) as 
() ()
* 1 tp w t t M DW τ ∆= − ∆ + ∆ . Inserting  () ()











∆= + − − − ∆  +    
(22) 
     
The sign of (22) is clearly positive. Hence, given the tax system as described by inequality 
(18) above, the “wage channel” dominates the “excess dividend channel”. 
 
Assuming instead that 
max D R ≤ , which means that, in addition to wage income 
* W , the 
owner withdraws only normal dividends taxed at the rate  pd τ at the personal level, equation 













∆= + − − − ∆  +    
(23) 
 
Expression  (23) is negative when the inequality (18) holds, implying that payment of normal 
dividends dominates wages as a method of channeling earnings to the owner.  
 
In summing up, we find that the Swedish tax code, as described in (18), implies a clear 
pecking order between the alternative ways of withdrawing earnings from the closed 
corporation. Normal dividends are tax-preferred, followed by wage income, which in turn 
dominates excess dividends. Since the tax code does not impose any limitation on the amount 
withdrawn as wage income, the company will never distribute earnings as dividends in excess 
of maximum normal dividends. For a firm that pays wage income to its owner, the marginal 
source of retained earnings is therefore a reduction in wages, 
* W . 
 
Taking account of the imputation system, which effectively reduces the personal tax rate on 
dividends to zero, the Finish tax code also fulfills the inequalities in (18). Performing a similar 
analysis for Finland as above shows exactly the same financial pecking order, i.e. normal 
dividends dominate wages that in turn dominate excess dividends as channels for distributing 
income to the owner. Hence, the closed corporation will never pay excess dividends and, 
further, the marginal source of retained earnings is a reduction in the owner’s wages, 
* W . 
  16 
Illustrating the pecking order in Norway is more complicated. The taxation of personal 
income P  defined by equation (15) above, affects the owner’s choice between wages 
* W  and 
dividends D as alternative forms of withdrawing earnings from the corporation. To explore 
the incentives involved, assume that the firm is in a steady-state equilibrium where the owner 
attempts to withdraw the earnings of her corporation in a tax-minimizing way. For the sake of 
the argument, assume first that P > 0. Raising wages and reducing dividends according to 
() ()
* 11 tt D pW τ ∆= −− +∆  (see the Swedish case above) would then change the owner’s 
after-tax cash flow from the firm according to  
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The first term within brackets captures the after-tax value of an additional unit of wage 
income, while the second term is due to the reduced tax on personal income tax (note that 
higher 
* W  reduces P ). The third term is the after-tax dividend foregone by the substitution.   
Our assumptions about the Norwegian tax parameters
33 imply that  0
N M ∆>, which means 
that the owner does have an incentive to undertake this substitution of wage income for 
dividends. This incentive remains until P  is reduced to zero.  Provided that reporting a 
negative P  does not give rise to any refund of tax, a further substitution of 
* W  for D is, 
however, clearly not in the interest of the owner. We derive (with  0 P ≤ )    
 











∆= + − − − ∆ 
+− 
,   (25) 
 
and for the parameter values given in footnote 33, 
N
t M ∆  is negative.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
32 In this case  () () ()
* 1 tp w t t p w p d t M DW R ττ τ ∆= − ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ , and with  () ()
* 11 tt t D Rp W τ ∆= ∆= − − +∆ , 
equation (23) follows after a few manipulations. 
33 Following the description of the Norwegian tax rules in chapter 2, we assume that  0.493 pw τ = , 
0.11 pd τ = , 0.28 τ =  and  0.141 p = .  17 
The conclusion from equations (24) and (25) is thus that the owner will withdraw wages from 
the corporation sufficient to put  0 P = , leaving remaining after-tax corporate earnings, equal 
to  () 1 K ρ τ − , to be paid as dividends.
34  
 
Though the role of the owner’s wages 
* W  as a form of withdrawing corporate earnings is 
similar in all Nordic countries, the implications for financing a marginal investment differ. In 
Finland and Sweden, the marginal source of retained earning is a reduction in wages, 
* W . 
Given that the owner in Norway has an incentive to adjust wage withdrawals to eliminate the 
tax on personal income, that is setting  0 P = , a reduction in 
* W  to finance additional 
investment will raise P  above zero and hence trigger payment of tax. This mechanism is 
captured by the first two terms within brackets of (24), and can be further clarified by directly 
computing the impact on the owner’s after tax cash flow M  of an increase in investment I  
financed by a reduction in 
* W . Using the firm’s budget constraint (3), the personal income 
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∆= ∆ − ∆ = − + ∆ 
+− −  
. (26) 
 
With the parameter values given in footnote 33, (see also table 1, chapter 2), we find that the 
bracketed term of (26) takes the value of 1.19, that is an investment of one krona makes the 
owner forego an after-tax income of 1.19 kronor. Reducing wages 
* W  to finance additional 
investment hence makes no sense, since the owner always has the less expensive option to 
inject additional funds into the firm by issuing new shares. We conclude, therefore, that the 
marginal source of retained earning for the closely held corporation in Norway is a reduction 
in dividends,  tt D I ∆= − ∆ . In this case we then derive 
 
  () 1
N
t tt p d t M DT A X I τ ∆= ∆ − ∆ = − −∆ ,     (27)
    
which means that the owner foregoes less than one krona per krona of corporate investment. 
                                                 
34 With  0 P = , the amount of dividends follows from (15) and the firm’s budget constraint (3), with  0 IN ==  
in steady-state. 
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The optimality conditions 
We present the optimization procedure for Sweden, and refer to appendices for the 
corresponding calculations and first order conditions for Finland (appendix B) and Norway 
(appendix C). Given the owner’s objective and the constraints on behavior as defined above, 
her problem may be re-written as  
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The Lagrange shadow values are 
i
t λ  for  ,,,,, iD C B E K Z =  and the Kuhn-Tucker shadow 
values are 
j
t η  for j
* ,,,, D NBR W = . We get the following first-order conditions:  
 
t C :  0
t
C
Ct U λ −= ,    (28) 
t Z :  0
t
Z
Zt U λ −= ,    (29) 
t D :  () 10
CD D
tp w t t λτλ η −− + = ,     (30) 
*
t L :  () 10 *
t
DZ
tt L F λτ λ −− =,     (31) 
e
t L :  () 10
* Ce Z W e
tp w t t ww λτ λ η −− + =,     (32) 
t L :  () () () 11 0
t
D
tL Fp w τλ −− + = ,     (33) 
t N :  0
CNDE
tttt ληλλ −+ + + = ,     (34) 
t R :  () 0
CD R B
tp wp d t t t λτ τ η η λ −− + − = ,     (35) 
*
t W :  () () () 11 1 0
* CD W
tp w t t p λτλτ η −− −+ += ,   (36) 
t I :  0
DK
tt λλ −+ = ,     (37)  19 
t b :  () () ()
1
1 11 1 0
CC
tt p i i λβ λ τ
−
+ −+ +− = ,     (38) 




tt t λβ ρ λ λ
−
++ −+ + + = ,     (39) 





tt K t F λβ λ τλ
+
−
++ −+ + − + = ,   (40) 




tt t λη β ρ λ
−
+ −++ + + = .     (41) 
 
In next chapter we will examine the economic effects of taxing closely held corporations 
using these first-order conditions. 
 
4. Economic effects of taxation 
The steps for solving for the cost of capital in the long run are illustrated for the case of 
Sweden, and we present the results of corresponding calculations for Finland and Norway. To 
determine the short run cost of capital we confine the analysis to the Swedish rules and we 
make use of numerical simulations to illustrate the growth path of the firm following a new 
share issue. The discussion of tax effects on the owner’s labor supply that ends this chapter is 
also focused on the Swedish tax rules. 
 
The long run cost of capital 
From expression (40) we may solve for  K F , which is the required pre-tax rate of return on 




















=+ −  − 
.     (42) 
 
The crucial factor in determining the cost of capital will be the shadow value of capital, 
K λ , 
or, more specifically, the change in the shadow value between two subsequent periods. Note 
that 
K D
tt λλ =  from (37) and  1 1
CC
tt λλ + =  from (38) when we impose the restriction that the 
rate of time preference equals the after-tax interest rate, i.e.  () 1 pi i βτ =− , for all t. When the 
marginal investment is financed with a wage reduction, we assume that the total wage income 
is larger than the floor, 
*e e
tt Ww L W +>, and that new share issues are set to zero,  0 t N = . This  20 
implies that (36) can be rewritten as  11
DD CC
tt tt λλ λλ ++ =  and, hence,  1 1
KK
tt λλ+ = . The cost of 











,     (43) 
 
which is the long run cost of capital to the closed corporation. The corresponding expressions 
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−+−  − +  =−
++  −−  ++ 
+ 
−+−  +   =+ −  + −−   −  + 
.  (43N) 
 
We note that expression (43) for Sweden only depends on the owner’s rate of time preference 
and the statutory corporate tax rate, that is, the long-run cost of capital is the same as for 
widely held corporations (assuming, as we do here, that there is no tax on capital gains). 
Neither the personal taxes on dividends and wage income, nor the special rules for 
determining the seize of normal dividends (e.g. the imputation parameter ρ ) matter. Though 
this result may seem surprising, it is an exact parallel to the familiar finding of the new view of 
equity, that the long-run cost of capital for a (widely held) corporate firm with retained 
earnings as the marginal source of funds is independent of the tax on dividends (cf. Auerbach 
(1979) and Sinn (1987)). Expression (43) implies that the closed firm is in a “trapped equity”  21 
regime, where a (possible) high rate of tax on the marginal source of income (owner’s wages) 
not only means that the after-tax amount remaining from one krona of pre-tax business 
income is small, but also that the opportunity cost of retaining funds for new investment in the 
firm is equally low.  
 
The fact that Sweden and Finland make use of different bases when determining normal 
dividends has important long-run effects. The Finnish scheme, where the base is related to the 
stock of capital, implies that the long-run cost of capital is lower for closed corporations than 
for widely held corporate firms, as seen from (43F) (the bracketed term in (43F) is positive). 
This preferential tax treatment of the closely held corporations is stronger the higher is the 
imputation parameter ρ .  
 
The complicated Norwegian scheme of splitting the pre-tax earnings of the corporate firm into 
income from labor and income from capital affects the cost of capital through several 
interrelated mechanisms.  The cost of capital is lowered because the dividend tax lowers the 
after-tax cost to the owner of retaining funds for investment, 1 pd τ − , and increased because 






. Moreover, the 
higher is the imputation parameter  ρ , the lower is the cost of capital. The second line of 
(43N) shows that the net effect of these offsetting mechanisms may or may not cause the cost 












, that is, that the imputation parameter equals the owner’s pre-tax rate 
of return requirement. 
 
From the first order condition with respect to the labor input, expression (33), we find that the 
marginal product of labor on the optimal path equals the total wage rate, i.e. payroll tax 
included,  () 1 L F pw =+ . The factors determining the owner’s labor effort 
* L  are somewhat 
more complicated to analyze. As shown by expressions (31) and (32), optimal 
*
t L  also 
depends on e.g. the marginal valuations of consumption 
C
t λ  and capital  ()
K D
tt = λλ . However, 




















L F pw =+ . Hence, neither the amount of managerial effort optimally used by the firm, 
nor the optimal input of hired labor will be affected by the special rules governing the taxation 
of closed firms. Performing exactly the same operations for Finland and Norway shows that 
the same result holds for those countries as well. 
 
The short run cost of capital 
The cost of raising new equity by issuing new shares is more difficult to analyze. As is usual, 
we will assume that new shares are issued only occasionally as a response to an exogenous 
disturbance to the productivity of capital, and when retained earnings are insufficient to 
finance the required addition to the capital stock.  However, and following the approach used 
by Sinn (1991), we also assume that the owner will choose to inject less than the total amount 
of funds needed to reach a new long-run equilibrium. The reason for this is that once a 
“nucleus” of new equity has been injected, the firm can start on a “growth path” by using less 
expensive retained earnings. The firm then continues to grow by internal funds until the 
marginal productivity of capital has been brought down to its long-run value.  
 
Sinn’s “growth path” or “nucleus” theory of equity is developed within a highly stylized 
model, with a dividend tax as the only policy parameter. When the firm is hit by an exogenous 
shock that raises the marginal productivity of capital, or Tobin’s marginal q, the firm obtains 
new equity sufficient to depress q to unity. The growth path financed by retained earnings 
then follows, and continues until within finite time marginal q is reduced to its long-run value 
of unity minus the dividend tax rate.  
 
In our model of the closed corporation Tobin’s marginal q is given by the shadow value
K λ , 













.     (44) 
 
When (44) holds, the owner is indifferent between retaining business earnings (taxed at the 
rate τ  with the firm) and withdrawing earnings as wage income (deductible against the 
corporate income tax, but subject to payroll tax p and income tax  pw τ ). 
  23 
The starting condition
35 – determining the seize of the initial equity issue – takes a rather 
complicated form for the closed company. If the closed company issues shares in period t, i.e. 
0 t N > , the associated shadow value is  0
N
t η =  and the marginal valuation of capital in the 
short run then follows from expression (34) as 
 
SR K C E
tt t q λλλ ≡=− ,     (45) 
 
which, besides the owner’s marginal valuation of consumption 
C
t λ , also depends on 
E
t λ , i.e. 
the marginal valuation of  the acquisition cost of the firm’s shares. The derivation of 
E
t λ  is 























  −  +−    −− − − −     −+ + +         
(46) 
 
The starting condition depends on the special tax treatment of the closed corporation. The 
term () () 11 pd τ τ −−  in the last parenthesis shows the after-tax value of one unit of business 
income distributed as a normal dividend to the owner, while the term () () 11 pw p τ −+  shows 
the after-tax value of one unit of business income withdrawn as owner’s wage income. Note 
that in the absence of tax discrimination between normal dividends and wage income, the last 
bracketed term in (46) would equal zero. The short run marginal valuation of capital would 
then simplify to 
SR K C q λλ ≡= , which is the same starting condition as for a (utility 
maximizing) widely held corporate firm. However, given the tax treatment assumed here (see 
expression (18) above), the first term of the last parenthesis is larger than the second, and the 
effect of this tax asymmetry is strengthened the higher is the imputed return parameter ρ . 
Moreover, since normal dividends are paid neither the year of the new issue nor on the 
subsequent growth path and since, in addition, they may be saved for later use, also the 
relationship between the interest earned on the stock of unused normal dividends, ρ , and the 
owner’s discount rate β  matters. An effect of this is that the time required (denoted as χ  in 
                                                 
35 The starting condition is simply  1
SR q =  for Sinn’s firm, or 
SR C q λ = if Sinn’s firm were to maximize the 
owner’s utility.  24 
equation (46)) for the firm to reach its new long-run equilibrium enters the short run marginal 
valuation of capital. For  ρβ =  equation (46) simplifies to 
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which is independent of the duration of the growth path. Moreover, 
SR q  is clearly lower than 
C λ , provided that dividends are tax favored compared to wage income.  
 
Following the new issue, and for the next  1 χ −  periods (the symbol χ denotes the duration of 
the growth path), the firm will neither issue more shares nor distribute dividends or owner’s 
wages (above the floor W ). It will instead retain all internally generated income and grow 
towards the new long run equilibrium. When reaching the new long-run equilibrium capital 
stock in period t χ +  the closed company starts to pay both normal dividends ()
max
t R χ +  and 
owner’s wages exceeding the floor, implying that 
* 0
W
t χ η + = . The long run marginal valuation 
of capital is then given by (44) above. 
 
Unfortunately, neither Sinn’s nor our model can be used to derive an explicit expression for 
the short run cost of capital. Though 
K
t λ  in (42) is given by equation (47),  1
K
t λ +  (1 t +  is the 
first year on the growth path following the new issue) cannot be determined without further 
assumptions. However, because the present model is written in discrete time, we will be able 
to make considerable progress in examining the firm’s growth path by resorting to numerical 
simulation. This is the topic of next section. 
 
The growth path 
The short and long run marginal valuations of capital will play a crucial role in determining 
the firm’s growth path following a new share issue. As long as the marginal valuation of 
capital is larger than 
SR q  it is profitable to put additional new equity into the firm. This pushes 
the valuation of capital down to 
SR q , where the firm stops issuing more shares and instead 
uses all available internally generated profits, that is  () ( ) 1 I FK τ =− , for growing until 
LR q  
is reached. This is the mechanism we will make use of when simulating the growth path.  25 
Starting in the new long run equilibrium where 
LR q is given by (44) and the marginal 
productivity of capital by (43) we solve the model backwards by using (42). From the long-
run capital stock, implicitly given by (43), we subtract annual investment to obtain the capital 
stock and the marginal productivity of capital for the previous year. This step-wise procedure, 
which is repeated until the marginal valuation of capital 
K λ reaches 
SR q , allows us to derive 
numerically the marginal productivity of capital, or the cost of capital, for each year on the 
growth path. The duration of this adjustment path, denoted as χ  in equation (46), is then 
determined endogenously. 
 
The simulation procedure requires a specification of the firm’s production function. To keep 
the model as simple as possible we neglect labor and let the production function be 
 
  () F Ka K
α = ,     (48) 
 
where a> 0 determines the level of the technology, and α  is the share of capital.
36 Further, 
the marginal product of capital in long run is given by 
1 − =
α α aK F
LR K . Equating the long run 
cost of capital given in (43) and the marginal product of capital from the production function, 












.     (49) 
 
With  0.4 α = ,  0.1 βρ == ,  1 LR K =  and a as given by (49) we obtain a growth path of 
χ = 5.25 years, assuming that the tax parameters take values representative for Sweden in 
2001 (see note to Table 1). The marginal productivity of capital, expressed as a proportion of 
the long run cost of capital, is shown in Table 2 for each year of the adjustment period.
37 With 
β =0.1, and τ = 0.28, the long run cost of capital, 
LR K F , given in (43) is 0.1389. 
 
                                                 
36 Note that the production function used in this illustration is a special case of the separable production function 
() ()
*
tt t t F Ka K c L e L
ε αγ =+ + that will be used below. The amount of labor supply turns out to be a constant in 
this illustration and therefore neglected.  26 
Table 2. The cost of capital (COC) during the growth path. 
Period  5.25 t χ +−   5 t χ +−   4 t χ +−   3 t χ +−   2 t χ +−   1 t χ +−   t χ +  
COC  4.77
LR
K F   4.04
LR
K F   2.51
LR
K F   1.82
LR
K F   1.43
LR
K F   1.18
LR
K F  
LR
K F  
Note: The simulations assume that  0.28,  0.3,  0.57 and  0.3292 pd pw p ττ τ == = = .  5.25 χ =  is the duration of the growth 
path. 
 
Immediately following the new issue, the marginal product of capital – which, following 
Sinn, may be viewed as the cost of new issues of shares – is almost 4.8 times the long run cost 
of capital (with retained earnings as the marginal source of funds). This is also considerably 
higher than the cost of new equity obtained from the standard King-Fullerton formula.
38 
Dividing the after-tax required rate of return of 10 percent ( 0.1) β =  by unity minus the total 
tax burden on distributed (wage) income, yields a pre-tax cost of capital which is 3.09 times 
the long run cost of capital.
39 
40 For comparison we also note that a widely held corporate firm 
– were the long-run cost of capital is the same as for the closed corporation (see equation 
(43)) – according to our simulations, will have a marginal productivity of capital immediately 
after the new issue, which is 3.51 times its long-run cost of capital. The special rules for the 
closed corporations hence raise the short-run rate of return requirement on new investment 
financed by an issue of new shares by more than one third (4.77/3.51=1.359). As a result of 
this, the growth path for the widely held firm is shorter, or 4.75 years compared to 5.25 years 
for the closed corporation. 
 
Table 3 below gives some further information on the sensitivity of the results to alternative 




                                                                                                                                                         
37 The magnitudes of α  and  () βρ =  only affect the length of the growth path. An increase in  β  reduces the 
length, while an increase in the capital share α  increases the length of the growth path.  
38 See King-Fullerton (1984), pp. 18. 
39 The King-Fullerton cost of new equity for a closed corporation is then 
() () () ()() ( )
0.1
0.429




−− −+ + −
, which is 3.09 times the long-run cost of 0.1389. 
40 Simplifying our model to make it replicate Sinn’s stylized tax system (with the dividend tax as the only tax 
parameter), we find that the short run cost of capital (following the new issue) is in the order of 3.5 times the 
long-run cost of capital. The standard King-Fullerton formula by comparison then gives a cost of new equity that 
is 1.43 times the long-run capital cost.   27 




K F  
SR
K F  
β     .05 ρ =   .10 ρ =  
.05 6.94 33.78
41






K F  is the long run cost of capital, and 
SR
K F  is the short run cost of capital. The model requires  βρ ≥ . The 
simulations assume that  0.28,  0.3,  0.57 and  0.3292 pd pw p ττ τ == = = .  
 
Owner’s labor supply 
We next turn to the owner’s labor supply. Our intention is to examine how the rules for 
withdrawing earnings from the closed company affect the owner’s trade off between work and 
leisure, and between working inside and outside of the own firm. We will focus on the tax 
treatment of normal dividends, R, depending, inter alia, on the imputed return parameter, ρ . 
To simplify, we will treat R as a parameter of the tax system, and examine the effect on 
* L  of 
a change in R. We are only interested in the long run effect, and we therefore ignore possible 
labor input changes during the growth path. Furthermore, we will assume that the closed 




tt t t F Ka K c L e L
ε αγ =+ + ,       (50) 
 
implying that any change in the amount of owner’s labor input 
* L  will not change the long 
run optimal capital stock.
44  
 
The existence of an external labor market enables the owner to separate the decision on how 
much to work in the own business and how much to work outside the firm at the going market 
wage, 
e w . The amount of effort put into the own firm then follows from the first order 
condition  () * 1
t
e
L F pw =+ , i.e. independent of the preferences of the owner. In the absence of 
                                                 
41 The cost of new share issues is 4.87 times the long run cost of capital (33.78/6.94=4.87). 
42 The cost of new share issues is 6.52 times the long run cost of capital (90.61/13.89=6.52). 
43 The cost of new share issues is 4.77 times the long run cost of capital (66.19/13.89=4.77). 
44 The picture to have in mind is that the stocks of capital and labor in the closed corporation exceed some 
minimum level. This is to prevent the unrealistic scenario of positive output with zero input in some of the 
factors.  28 
an external labor market for the owner, the outcome will instead depend on the owner’s 
preferences over consumption and leisure. Combining the first order conditions (28), (29), 



















.     (51) 
 
We once more emphasize that we are comparing two different long run states with the same 
capital stock but different amount of owner’s labor input, and thereby ignoring any indirect 
effects during the growth path. This means that we can isolate the consumption function as 
()
*, tt t CC L R = , where leisure now becomes the residual 
*
tt Z TL =− . Tax parameters p and 
pw τ  are constants and can be ignored when differentiating (51) with respect to R and 
* L . 
Carrying out the differentiation gives the effect on the owners’ labor input into the firm of an 
increase in the amount of business income treated as normal dividends (i.e. an increase in the 
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.   (52) 
 
We will follow the standard assumptions that the utility function is concave in consumption, 
0 CC U < , and that consumption and leisure are complementary,  0 CZ U > . These assumptions 
and the fact that we are maximizing utility, i.e. the second order condition is negative, 
guarantees a negative partial derivative.
45 Thus, the owner’s effort decreases in the closed 
company if a larger amount of business income may be withdrawn as tax favored normal 
dividends. The intuition for this result can be understood from a Slutsky decomposition of the 
effects. The substitution effect is zero because the increase in R does not change any relative 
prices at the margin. Hence, owners have no incentive to increase the labor supply. However, 
an increase in R has a direct income effect that will affect the amount of consumption 
positively. Assuming that leisure is a normal good, the income effect will reduce labor supply. 
                                                 
45 Since we are maximizing utility the second order condition is postulated negative, i.e. 
** *
2 0 CC C ZZ LL L UF U F U ++ < .  
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The bottom line is hence that a more lenient tax treatment of the closed corporation, by way 
of allowing an increased share of business income to be treated as normal dividends, will 
cause the sole owner to reduce his work effort. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Drawing on the standard neoclassical model of firm behavior, as used in the taxation 
literature, and the static farm household model, we have examined the economic effects of the 
Nordic systems of taxing closely held corporations. The special tax rules were introduced in 
the beginning of the 1990’s in order to mitigate the incentives for tax shifting offered by the 
introduction of the dual income tax system. Though all three countries adhere to the basic idea 
of splitting earnings into income from capital and income from labor by imputing capital 
income, the chosen techniques differ in important ways.  
 
The Swedish scheme, where the amount of tax favored normal dividends are determined by 
multiplying the presumptive rate of return by the acquisition cost of the shares of the 
corporation, gives the same long-run cost of capital for closed corporations as for widely held 
corporations. We show that in long-run equilibrium, the firm is in a “trapped equity” regime, 
where a high rate of tax on the marginal source of income (owner’s wages) not only means 
that the after-tax amount remaining from one krona of pre-tax business income is small, but 
also that the opportunity cost of retaining funds for new investment in the firm is equally low.  
Since the marginal source of funds is retained earnings, the marginal investment leaves the 
acquisition cost of the corporate shares unchanged, and the effect of this is to make the long-
run cost of capital invariant to the rate at which capital income is imputed to the owner. 
 
Finland’s approach to taxing closed corporations is similar to that of Sweden. An important 
difference, however, is that income from capital is determined by applying the presumptive 
rate of return to the business assets of the corporation. As this bases increases when the firm 
invests, the long-run cost of capital turns out to be a negative function of the rate used for 
imputing capital income. In terms of the long-run cost of capital, Finnish closely held 
corporations are therefore favored by the tax system, compared to widely held corporate 
firms. 
  30 
The taxation of closed corporations in Norway is particularly complicated, and aside from the 
regular corporate tax, the owner faces a possibility to pay tax on three accounts, for dividends, 
for wage income and for personal income (“personinntekt”). The income splitting - which 
determines the amount of personal income - applies to the pre-tax income of the corporation, 
and is independent of the extent to which the firm pays dividends. The Norwegian scheme is 
shown to have a neutral impact of the long-run cost of capital (compared to the treatment of 
widely held firms), provided that the rate of return used for imputing capital income is set 
equal to the owner’s pre-tax rate of return requirement. 
 
Focusing on the Swedish tax rules, we have also examined the closed corporation’s short run 
adjustment to a productivity shock. We have computed the pre-tax marginal return to capital 
needed to justify an issue of new equity, and we simulated the firm’s internally financed  
“growth path” following the new issue. Though the growth path idea was suggested by Sinn 
(1991) some time ago, and has been used in later research (see for example Kari (1999)), we 
extend earlier work by offering a quantitative characterization of the growth path and a 
measure of the duration of the adjustment phase. We find that the special rules for the closed 
corporations raise the short-run rate of return requirement on new investment financed by new 
share issues by more than one third, compared to the case of widely held corporations.  As a 
result of this, the growth path for the closely held firm is longer. 
 
The owner’s choice between withdrawing earnings from her firm as wages and as dividends is 
in general a matter of tax planning, unrelated to the owner’s actual labor effort put into the 
firm. However, in a final section of the paper, we have tentatively examined also the owner’s 
choice between working inside and outside of the firm, and between work and leisure. We 
have found that a more lenient tax treatment, by way of allowing an increased share of 
business income to be treated as tax favored normal dividends, will cause the owner to reduce 
her work effort in the closed corporation. This result presumes that no external labor market 
for managerial services is available to the owner.  
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Appendix A 
This appendix derives the expression for 
E
t λ  used in the definition of the short run marginal q.  
For a closed corporation issuing shares in period t and returning to long run equilibrium in 
period t χ +  the constraints looks as following, with obvious signs of the shadow values. 
 
t  
*e e Ww LW +=  0 N >   0 DR ==   0 B >   I NR E =+  
1,..., 1 tt χ ++ −  *e e Ww LW +=  0 N =   0 DR ==   0 B >   I RE =  
,1 , . . . tt χχ ++ +   *e e Ww LW +>  0 N =   0 DR =>   0 B =   I RE =  
 
That is, for the next  1 χ −  periods following a new share issue the firm will neither issue more 
shares nor distributing dividends or owner’s wage (over the floor). It will instead retain all 
internal generated income and grow towards the new long run equilibrium. When reaching the 
new capital stock in period t χ +  the closed firm starts to pay both dividends and owner’s 




































,     (A2) 
 
since  1 0
B
t η + =  due to  0 B >  during the growth path. When the new long run equilibrium is 
reached in period t χ +  we know that  1 ...
BB B
tt L R χχ λλ λ ++ + == = . Taking this into account we can 
solve for 
E














 =−   + +  
.     (A3) 
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Hence, next step is to find an expression for 
B λ  in the long run. From (30) we have a relation 
for 
D
t χ η + , and by using (36) it becomes 
 










=− −   −+ 
.     (A4) 
 
When the entrepreneurial firm issues more shares it does not distribute any income to the 
owner, i.e.  0 t R = , and therefore store the amount  1 tt B E ρ − = . However, as long as the firm is 
in long run equilibrium we have  0 t R χ + >  and, hence,  0
R
t χ η + =  implying that (35) can be 

















.     (A5) 
 
But since (A5) is the long run value, we have found an expression for 
E

















  −  +−
  =− − −    +− + +   
. (A6) 
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Appendix B - Finland 
The Finnish owner’s problem is to maximize 
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with the following first order conditions  
 
t C :  0
t
C
Ct U λ −= ,    (B1) 
t Z :  0
t
Z
Zt U λ −= ,       ( B 2 )  
t D :  () 10
CD D
tp w t t λτλ η −− + = ,     (B3) 
*
t L :  () 10 *
t
DZ
tt L F λτ λ −− =,     (B4) 
e
t L :  () 10
* Ce Z W e
tp w t t ww λτ λ η −− + =,     (B5) 
t L :  () () () 11 0
t
D
tL Fp w τλ −− + = ,     (B6) 
t N : 0
CND
ttt ληλ −++ = ,     (B7) 
t R :  () 0
CD R K
tp wp d t t t λτ τ η η η −− + − = ,     (B8) 
*
t W :  () () () 11 1 0
* CD W
tp w t t p λτλτ η −− −+ += ,   (B9) 
t I : 0
DK
tt λλ −+ = ,     (B10) 
t b :  () () ()
1
1 11 1 0
CC
tt p i i λβ λ τ
−
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1
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tt K t t F λβ λ τλ ρ η
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and we see from (B10) that 
DK
tt λλ =  still holds. Solving for the cost of capital in long run we 
note that  1
KK
tt λλ + = , so we must only focus on the ratio  11
KK
tt η λ ++  in (B13). From (B3) and (B8) 
we have  () 11 1 1
KC D
tt p d t η λτ λ ++ + =− − , where  1 0
R
t η + =  since  1 0 t R + >  in long run equilibrium. 
Further,  1 0
* W
t η + =  since  11
*e e
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Appendix C - Norway 
The Norwegian owner’s problem is to maximize  
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with the following first order conditions 
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tt λλ =  from (C9). In solving the cost of capital in the long run the assumption of 
steady state considerably simplifies expression (C13). As explained above, the firm will pay 
both dividends and withdraw owner’s wage income, i.e.  0 t D >  and 





tt ηη ==. From (C3) and (C9) we derive  (1 )
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, and we finally get the long 
run, or steady state, marginal product of capital  
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